Tuesday, March 1, 2016

Equality of Interests, Reason, and Citizens United


Brettschneider proposed the value theory of democracy as an alternative other theories that suffer the problem of constraint. Brettschneider depicts the problem of constraint as a choice between “procedures and principles,” noting that one can either “abandon the notion that preconditions are intrinsic to procedural legitimacy, or she must suggest a justification for preconditional rights that does not depend on their affirmation by those participating in a procedure” (15). In short, Brettschneider seems to be accusing proceduralists of using the word itself in its definition. He argues instead for procedure independent values that themselves are representative of a democratic ideal. One of the values he comes up with is equality of interest. He argues that equality of interest require that “all reasonable interests of citizens be respected as having equal weight,” and likens it to the notion of “one person one vote” (23).  I had a few thoughts on this. First, given his decision to accept the Rawlsian notion of reason as his criterion for reasonable I am inclined to think that his vision of democracy will suffer from the same issues of implicit bias that Lebron pointed out in Color of Our Shame. While no one will reasonable be interested in slavery, those who implicitly support an unequal society will continue to use their one vote to reify that kind of society. My second thought relates to the notion of equal weight. As I was reading this section, I couldn’t help but think of the Citizens United case. While the case and the notion of a company or organization being able to express is views like a citizen is applicable to other issues like freedom of speech, I really am curious what Brettschneider would say to the fact that the Supreme considers corporations to have “reasonable interests” that must be weighted equally to any other citizen. Especially in light of our recent readings of Lebron and Hampton that highlight the possibly flawed, yet reasonable, interests such institutions might hold.

1 comment:

  1. Thanks for the post Campbell, I am intrigued by the citizens united decision in relation to this reading. It seems that Brettschneider doesn't directly deal with the type of situation that came up in citizens united. He writes, "no one person should have his interests counted more than those of any other person by virtue of his social position or class." Using wealth to amplify one's voice in a democracy would seem to violate equality of interests on this account of using one's class for political advantage. It is difficult to deny the power of wealth in political campaigning: individual votes don't intrinsically count more, but the ability of citizens to decide based on unbiased and fair information is limited. To me, this seems like coercion on the level of propaganda, but since it is propaganda from a corporation, it wouldn't be subject to the kind of substantiative constraints that Brettshcneider proposes in Chapter 2 such as the requirement of reciprocity and being given a reason for coercion. Perhaps citizens united wouldn't seem so ridiculous to Brettshcneider, given his statement that "in no sense can citizens be regarded as rulers if restrictions are placed on how they can think about politics" (45.) In some sense, restricting the ability for corporations to finance campaigns, the individuals within the corporation are denied their rights as speakers. But in another sense, by dominating political speech by amplifying the value of one's voice through wealth undermines the value of the rights of listeners. To the corporation, individuals are not treated as active thinkers, but as ends to a private means. I would hope that Brettschneider's substantiative limits would have some force in protecting the equal value of speech, rather than just limits on its regulation. The line is very blurry however, and it is easy to see why some may be afraid that "a polity that seeks to protect its citizens from its own ideas fundamentally violates the ideal of citizens as rulers" (49.) I don't think any of the authors we've read have provided any solid ethical way of thinking about this idea, what does everyone else think?

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