What we mean by the phrase "self-interested" or "selfish" has been bothering me for some time, and I wanted to examine it a little more closely. To dispel any confusion, when I discuss selfishness, I'm not talking about Smith's "selfish passions" (joy and grief) but rather the concept of selfishness itself.
Step 1: In my view, there is a powerful (or at the very least, bothersome) theoretical argument to say that everything a human can do is selfish. One might immediately point to an altruistic action that we know humans have done before. How does this understanding characterize a soldier who jumps on a live grenade to save her comrades? The answer is simple, and it doesn't require an analysis of empirics: the soldier jumped on the grenade because that is what she wanted to do. The fact that she took this action means she weighed it against her alternatives (however briefly) and decided that this is the course she most preferred. While this act can't necessarily be said to benefit her, that is not relevant. She took an action which maximized the satisfaction of her own interest, insofar as her "own interest" was to jump on the grenade. In short, we will always act selfishly, because we will always do what we've decided we want to do most, even if it will benefit other people more than it will benefit us.
If one defines selfishness as pursuing a goal which will benefit oneself, I am contented to move beyond the semantic argument I have made in the above paragraph.
Step 2: Let's engage with Smith's characterization of sympathy. He beings, "How selfish soever man may be supposed, there are evidently some principles in his nature, which interest him in the fortune of others, and renders their happiness necessary to him, though he derives nothing from it except the pleasure of seeing it." Presumably, this is meant to imply that what gives rise to sympathy lies outside self-interest -- Smith wants to suggest that we naturally have a concern for conferring benefits onto our fellow man. However, "the pleasure of seeing" others' happiness is vastly understated, and it plays a critical role in Smith's account -- doing something kind for you makes me feel good, and so it benefits me. Furthermore, we "seem to be pleased when we are able to sympathize with [somebody], and hurt when we are unable to do so." Ergo, it often benefits us, and is thus selfish, to show sympathy -- why else would we seek fellow feeling with the dead? Surely it isn't for their benefit. Smith admits that we feel sympathy for the dead, and the reason we pay "vain honors" to their memory is to alleviate "our own misery [emphasis added]" at the prospect of being deprived of our worldly existence. I reason that since I am not allowing Person X to be forgotten, I too might avoid this cold fate; thus, sympathizing with Person X affords me some comfort.
Although Smith's account of sympathy leads us to interpersonal relations which we think are worthwhile, is there any convincing reason to believe that we aren't sympathetic merely because these relationships are in our best interest? In other words, couldn't any benefit our sympathy confers onto others be a positive externality of acting selfishly (which, as we saw in the death case, involves forming these relationships)?
Hey Mo, I definitely had the same question about Smith's work as you did, especially when considering the reading from Frank we recently completed. When reading Smith, I had the in the background the mechanistic explanation of human behavior that Frank proposes, and it seems to square well with Smith's account of our passions. I find it hard to argue with the theory that all of these passions are also just 'evolved' as Frank would put it, to act as natural restraints on behavior and facilitate cooperation that is mutually beneficial. If this is in fact the case, than almost all of our actions by their very nature are selfish: strictly for the deeper purpose of survival and propagation. Surely, some might say that the need for survival and propagation have been surpassed in modern life, perhaps giving rise to new 'deep purposes', but I haven't seen any clear or grounded justification for any other purpose other than a purely mechanistic one.
ReplyDeleteHey Mo, enjoyed your post. I had a somewhat similar issue with the hypocritical nature of our sympathy when reading 'Of the selfish passions'. Smith states in part 1 that it is in our nature to care for others and that the happiness of others is 'necessary...though he derives nothing from it except the pleasure of seeing it.' In other words, our somewhat unselfish nature allows us to gain pleasure from the successes and happiness of others. However, when discussing the selfish passions, Smith claims that great successes, which for the person who succeeds should bring the greatest happiness, in fact result in resentment; 'the congratulations of his best friends are not all of them perfectly sincere...a sentiment of envy commonly prevents us from heartily sympathizing with his joy.' This results in the successful person hiding their happiness and joy in order to appease his jealous companions and ultimately leads to the ending of the friendship.
ReplyDeleteMy question is why this is the case if Smith claims that the happiness of other is necessary for us and brings us pleasure? Surely if we are friends with a person, their success, no matter how envious we are of it, should still make us proud and happy with the person who achieves the success and should lead to admiration with that person, even if it leads us to be somewhat disappointed in ourselves for not attaining the same level of success.
Mo and Kaamil,
ReplyDeleteI think it is interesting to also consider Smith's discussions of the "weakness of friendship and humanity" in I.II.31. He brings up the fact that there is an agreement on the weakness of both friendship and humanity, and I think it is interesting to examine what he means by weakness. Does he mean that showing to much friendship or humanity is a weakness? Or does he mean that friendship or humanity as shown by most is only a weak example of the two? It would seem that he is discussing the first when he notes that "the too tender mother, the too indulgent father, the too generous and affectionate friend, may sometimes, perhaps, on account of the softness of their natures, be looked upon with a species of pity." Smith is quick to note that this softness of nature and related pity is not inherently a bad thing, but that "it is unfit for the world, because the world is unworthy of it." Smith seems to believe that the world is unfit for such truly unselfish actions because most men will take advantage of them. This would seem to imply that it is actually the second weakness. That the passions shown by most are only a weak facade of truly social passions, and in reality, all men and women act in their own selfish self-interest like you said.