On Cesco's Behalf: Trust Fund Sadist

 Posner begins his argument for a theory of wealth maximization by placing it in contrast with pure utilitarianism, which he sees as leading to undesirable conclusions. Posner frets, justifiably, about the incalculability of utilitarian equations, the tendency of utilitarianism to sacrifice the individual for the majority, and the monstrous results the theory upholds in the hypothetical case of a sadist with an enormous capacity for pleasure. Last semester, to show utilitarianism’s occasional unintuitive and likely undesirable results, Prof. Schroeder highlighted this last point by noting that if the pleasure he derived from stealing one of our laptops outweighed our suffering, it would be justifiable under a utilitarian calculation. Yet while the theory of wealth maximization is purportedly better than utilitarianism, it appears to also allow great amounts of similar injustice.

Posner goes on to mention that this “utility monster”—with a great capacity for pleasure and a penchant for activities that violate others’ rights—“has no place in a system of ethics founded on wealth maximization” (Posner 82). The theory of wealth maximization, he argues, avoids the utilitarian drawback of designating this sadist as morally justified. By establishing wealth maximization as the main enterprise of society, the pleasures (utility) that individuals experience are only considered to the extent that they are present in the price those individuals are willing to pay for something. But justifying certain monstrous actions on the basis of one’s ability and willingness to pay doesn’t seem too great a remedy. Indeed, Posner admits that the sadist would have to purchase her victims’ consent, something that would “soon deplete the wealth of all but the wealthiest sadists” (p. 82).

Given that Posner appears to take current wealth distribution as such, it isn’t too hard to imagine a society where the poor are driven to a point where some are willing to sell themselves for the murderous tastes of the extremely wealthy. While this is certainly a more drastic example, it highlights one of my major qualms with Posner’s argument—that simply a willingness and ability to pay shouldn’t determine the morality of an action. Barring some equalizing initial distribution of wealth, Posner’s theory appears to allow great injustices according to the tastes and wallet size of certain “industrious” individuals.