In discussing the strengths of his value theory of democracy, Brettschneider posits that it is superior to an epistemic conception. He writes, "[The value theory of democracy] does not rely, as do traditional human rights and natural rights theories, on an assumption of inherent human dignity" (9). Instead of relying on "controversial conceptions of personhood," Brettschneider claims we should rely on a "widely held concept" which is not "vulnerable to charges of sectarianism" (26). Indeed, in his discussion of the three core values from Chapter 1, he takes pains to avoid appealing to any comprehensive notion of truth.
It appears as if our author is concerned with (our familiar topic of) consent. He believes that we should appeal to a democratic procedure-independent standard, because this is the only way we can justifiably select values to set up our political system. Relying on any particular comprehensive view of the good is dangerous, because citizens "have an abundance of reasonable beliefs about what truth is...[and] conceptions of justice are similarly wide-ranging" (19). Someone might reasonably disagree with Rawls' epistemic theory of the original position, for example. Yet in democracy, "the values are of a people rather than imposed on them" as a way of respecting "the common ruling status of all persons subject to coercion" (26).
To me, our author is glossing over epistemic theories and their capacity to attain consent from a particular polity. If we return to my above example of Rawls' original position, it's clear that in his view, the veil of ignorance is as close as we can come to voluntary consenting to a theory of justice. This understanding of justice will then fundamentally restructure society's institutions. In this scheme, nothing is imposed on a group of people; we're merely pursuing justice as fairness.
Brettschneider claims, "The epistemic theorist...must demonstrate that [her] standard is more fundamental than democracy" (19). This is setting an unreasonably high bar for epistemic theorists, and the mere fact that there can be disagreement within "comprehensive views of the good" doesn't mean we should discount them as a set of theories -- there is also clearly disagreement about how to conceive of democracy. Neither is inherently fundamental. In my view, Brettschneider is trying to focus on an ideal of democracy, and he should stick with that discussion instead of claiming to address epistemic theories.
Mo, I wonder what you’re problem is with his addressing epistemic theories. It seems to me like you felt he should address them more thoroughly or not address them at all. I think that his distinction between epistemic theories as nondemocratic procedure independent and his own theory as democratic procedure independent serves to distinguish between the types of democracy they argue for. In introducing the idea of disagreement between different views of the good Brettschneider tries to highlight that epistemic theories place their view, what ever it is, above democratic institutions. Epistemic theories are placing some ideal above the people themselves in the name of democracy, and that, Brettschneider would argue, is fundamentally undemocratic. By doing this he would argue that it is no longer government of the people, by the people, and for the people, but government of the people, by the idea, for the idea.
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