An Ideal Concept in a Non-Ideal Theory

To account for the flaws in procedural and epistemic theories, Brettschenider proposes the value theory of democracy. The three core values: equality of interests, political autonomy, and reciprocity guarantee the protection of an individual’s procedural and substantive rights to respect the “all citizens as rulers” status in an ideal democracy (19).  By characterizing democracy as ideal, Brettschenider is careful to distinguish that he does not view democracy as the most ideal relationship in life, but “the best way to understand the relationship between the state at its citizens, and, more specifically, the best way to legitimize the state’s use of force” (11). He then furthers his argument by referring to the notion of an ideal democracy as “the most promising reference point” to understand political legitimacy (11).

Brettschneider’s value theory of democracy illustrates the tension and complexity between ideal and non-ideal theories. While Brettschenider’s theory conceptualizes democracy in an ideal form, and can consequentially be viewed solely as an ideal theory, I am convinced that his theory can also be categorized as non-ideal. In a framework where rights become viewed as compatible rather than distinct from democracy, democratic governments should ensure the maintenance of the core values in their procedures as well as their procedural outcomes to respect the citizens’ status as rulers, both as authors and addressees. He acknowledges that with such a high standard, many governments that are viewed as democratic may not be considered as such. However, Brettschenider quickly clarifies that, “The standard, however, is not-all-or-nothing. Rather, the realization of the democratic ideal as it is articulated by the core values is a matter of degree” (27). Even though there is a distinction between ideal and non-ideal theories, his comment leads me to question whether ideal elements are necessary for a non-ideal theory. Although Brettschenider is fully aware that democratic societies may fail to reach his high expectations, he continues to establish a high standard. Since this scenario could initially be viewed as a way to set polities up for failure with too high of a standard, we might question why Brettschenieder sets such an unachievable goal. But, by raising the bar to an ideal level, Brettschenieder ensures that democratic societies will work towards improvement. If such a high standard was not present, democracies could continue to remain stagnant. While democratic societies may consistently fall short from reaching the ideal, these polities are still accomplishing goals set forth by the core values and as a result, are in a better situation than before. Thus, I would also consider the value theory of democracy as non-ideal.