Posner's argument was interesting, however seems to ignore some very real world ethical concerns. Posner writes, "to summarize, the wealth-maximization principle encourages and rewards the traditional "calvinist" or "protestant" virtues and capacities associated with economic progress." (68.) He seems to take it as a given that these values are the right values to be pursuing. In the footnote, Posner briefly discussed the morality of the free market system, assuring the reader that the free market system promotes good qualities in humans, however I am reminded of our readings from Marx. The issues with the tension between owners of the means of production and laborers seem completely discounted in this account of free market economies. Economic progress as an absolute goal seems morally dubious to me, ignoring issues that surely ought to be important to one's life. Alienation seems inevitable in a system that promotes wealth-maximization as its highest value.
Environmental concerns were also a topic that came to my mind pretty immediately. Development and wealth-maximization treats natural resources as purely instrumental, not important in and of themselves to maintain. Endlessly developing has led humanity to destroy natural resources at an exponential rate at the expense of our future health and prosperity. As long as it promotes wealth, Posner would seem to ignore this deterioration from a moral standpoint.
Additionally, I found Posner's suggestion that appropriate compensation would justify nearly any action morally ambiguous. Posner purports to blend Kantian and Utilitarian theory, however in allowing almost any action to be morally acceptable through this compensation, he creates a world in which right and wrong are determined by the market. Such a cold and calculating view of morality seems dangerous to me. Substantiative limits on government action and action among people seems necessary if any theory is going to claim to protect individual choice and liberty. Posner directly points to one dangerous implication of his approach, with the feeble minded person, who "would have no right to the means of support even though there was nothing to blameworthy in his inability to support himself." (76.) The feeble minded person is of no value to Posner; I can't see how a system that results in this conclusion can be ethically viable.
Environmental concerns were also a topic that came to my mind pretty immediately. Development and wealth-maximization treats natural resources as purely instrumental, not important in and of themselves to maintain. Endlessly developing has led humanity to destroy natural resources at an exponential rate at the expense of our future health and prosperity. As long as it promotes wealth, Posner would seem to ignore this deterioration from a moral standpoint.
Additionally, I found Posner's suggestion that appropriate compensation would justify nearly any action morally ambiguous. Posner purports to blend Kantian and Utilitarian theory, however in allowing almost any action to be morally acceptable through this compensation, he creates a world in which right and wrong are determined by the market. Such a cold and calculating view of morality seems dangerous to me. Substantiative limits on government action and action among people seems necessary if any theory is going to claim to protect individual choice and liberty. Posner directly points to one dangerous implication of his approach, with the feeble minded person, who "would have no right to the means of support even though there was nothing to blameworthy in his inability to support himself." (76.) The feeble minded person is of no value to Posner; I can't see how a system that results in this conclusion can be ethically viable.
Hi Devon!
ReplyDeleteI really enjoyed your blog post, and it definitely brought up some concerns of mine as well. I was also considering our environment when reading Posner’s work. I was reminded of Tragedy of the Commons thinking in instances where we may take as much as we can of a shared resource at the moment with the long-term result of depleting the resource such that no person can use the resource. For instance, if we take the example of overfishing, in the short term, fishing a lake may increase our wealth, but in the long term, once the resource is depleted, it would decrease the wealth that otherwise would have been generated had the fish been able to naturally reproduce. On a larger scale, this is also true with climate change. Does wealth maximization transcend generations? If we develop today to increase our current wealth, in the long run we could end up with net negative well? Would Posner think that his theory accounts for this difference between wealth in the short term versus the long term?
Your later discussion on morality, brought up another question I had about what Posner would say about issues of abortion. Posner verges on touching issues of euthanasia (like with his grandfather example on page 57) and does not shy away from talking about issues of sacrificing life (like with his lamb and child examples as well as many of his other examples). Yet, what would he say in cases of abortion? In particular, what would he say about aborting a baby if the parents of a child knew that baby was going to suffer from a handicap or mental disability that would result in the parents taking care of the child for the rest of their life? Would he argue for abortion in cases where wealth would not be maximized by having a child? He examines on page 86 cases of implementing policies to limit the birth rate in order to ensure that families are kept at a size that maximizes wealth. This type of consideration seems to show that he may is not only open to abortion but would advocate for it. Furthermore, it would seem that he may advocate for abortion in many cases: cases where the parents are not ready for children, cases where the country does not need more children, and any other case where wealth would not be maximized by having this child. As you mention, I think this has severe moral consequences and quantifies life in a way that is entirely too one-dimensional and cold.