In
The Theory of Moral Sentiments, Adam
Smith provides an account of how we use our sentiments as a metric to judge
others’ propriety or impropriety. Propriety, or what is collectively considered
as conventionally proper behavior, derives through a process of approval and
adoption. Smith equates approval to adoption as he argues that, “To approve of
another man’s opinions is to adopt those opinions, and to adopt them is to
approve of them” (17). This continuous procedure determines what the proper
sentiments should be. According to Smith, we only approve of the sentiments
that correspond with our own, and conversely, reject those that disagree with
ours. Smith describes what we dictate as good taste or judgment are “wherever
his sentiments entirely correspond with our own” (19). In this account, Smith
assumes that our original sentiments defined as, the ones that we possess, are correct
and thus, the ones that should be reinforced. I am concerned with this
assumption.
While I agree with his explanation
of the emergence of propriety, Smith does not provide an account of how to
evaluate these original sentiments. If our original sentiments are wrong, then
through the process of approval and adoption, would we create a form of impropriety
that is actually camouflaged as propriety? Or does Smith believe that our
ability to approve and adopt is a sufficient standard to judge proper
sentiments? Based on his account, I think that Smith argues that humans have
this ability. However, in doing so, Smith places too high an amount of faith in
humans to correctly choose the components of propriety. In approving another
person’s judgment, Smith explains that we do not consider it as useful, but as
right and accurate, “for no other reason but because we find that it agrees
with our own” (20). The only standard of approval for Smith is whether or not these
sentiments correspond with ours. I would argue that this standard is a poor
benchmark to determine propriety. Just because they are own sentiments does not
automatically deem them as correct. By making this assumption, Smith abandons
the possibility that our own original sentiments could be wrong.
I think I'm going to take Smith's side on this one. Although you claim that his standard is a "poor benchmark" because these "original moral sentiments could be wrong," this rests on a problematic understanding of propriety. The bulk of Smith's theory relies on intersubjective understandings, which is why he believes that a judgement/expression of passion is right and accurate "for no other reason but because we find that it agrees with our own." In this picture, Smith isn't claiming that the conclusions we reach are objectively correct by any means -- indeed, he is explicitly trying to avoid assigning propriety an unchanging set of values. He can't claim to know what propriety means, because what is regarded as "proper" or "moral" will necessarily change over time.
ReplyDeleteLet's apply this to an example that comes up quite often within Smith's discussion. In numerous instances, he makes what we would consider some very sexist claims. While he (and many people from his time) would argue that the feeble, fearful woman is a correct characterization of the "fairer sex," I don't think he would say that women are objectively inferior this way. He would not attempt to adopt an outsider's perspective, because he realizes that we are limited to our own experience, and doing so would be pretty incoherent. On this reading, we are perfectly justified in saying that -- by our current standards of propriety -- Smith is a sexist pig and what he said is improper. Since we (presumably) all agree that this is a correct understanding of women's capacities, it becomes exactly that. Smith's understanding allows for what is moral/proper to change, and in my opinion this is one of the strengths of his account.
Mo, I agree that Smith's account of propriety allows for change as social opinion changes. However, like Tierra, I find this benchmark for determining propriety problematic. I believe that there must be a fixed aspect to morality that does not change as conventionally accepted standards change and that therefore there is a fixed aspect to propriety. If we believe that propriety can change, those who enforced "separate but equal" standards, were slaveholders in the American South during the 1800s, and called gays by derogatory names only a few decades ago acted with propriety. There seems to be something very problematic with this account.
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