Hi everyone. I found this reading really difficult, so I
would love it if you would correct me where I go wrong and help me put it all
together. I think I (maybe) have figured out what Strawon says about human
sentiments, but I don’t understand how this piece fits into his larger argument
about determinism vs. free will (i.e. please comment and help me out!).
Strawson tells us that as a condition of being human, we
have all kinds of natural inter-personal relationships and feelings. We care
whether the actions of other people show us positive attitudes such as goodwill
and affection or negative ones such as contempt or indifference. In response to
the attitudes of others, we engage in a range of reactive attitudes, which “are
essentially natural human reactions to the good or ill will, or indifference of
others towards us” (80). Additionally, these interactive feelings between two
people drive a whole spectrum of human relationships. And this spectrum is the aspect
that makes these relationships human because “being involved in inter-personal
relationships as we normally understand them precisely is being exposed to the
range of reactive attitudes and feelings that is in question” (81). We
therefore act humanly when we weigh similar actions that result in the same
level of injury in the light of a specific inter-personal relationship between
two people, and judge the transaction of punishment (or lack of punishment) on the
situation and the relationship itself. In some instances, resentment may be the
correct reactive attitude to hurt. In others, forgiveness. The capacity to have
specific inter-personal attitudes and therefore distinct relationships is
precisely what makes us human.
However, Strawson then asks, “What effect would, or should,
the acceptance of the truth of a general thesis of determinism have upon these
reactive attitudes? More specifically, would, or should, the acceptance of the
truth of the thesis lead to the decay or the repudiation of all such attitudes?”
and this is where I start to get lost in his argument (80). Does he answer this
question? He seems to conclude (I think), it is “useless to ask whether it
would not be rational for us to” engage in human interactions and commitments,
or in other words, “do what it is not in our nature to (be able to) do” (87). We
must have interpersonal commitments because to not have these relationships
would render us something other than human. But how does this answer the
determinism question?
Hey Bria,
ReplyDeleteI was also very confused by a lot of the reading. I think it is first important to get clear on what question Strawson is trying to answer in the first place. I thought that he wasn't really trying to answer the question of determinism, he is debating compatabilism, trying to show why the question of determinism is not related to issues of holding people morally responsible. His argument follows that because the process of holding people morally responsible is so ingrained in our human experience, it does not require an external or theoretical justification that the optimists and pessimists both are seeking. We can look to human experience for all the justification we need of moral responsibility, independent of the issue of determinsm. He changes the terms of the question rather than answering it directly, I think that's why it may seem really confusing towards the end.
Hi All!
ReplyDeleteI definitely agree that this was a dense and complex discourse, so correct me if I am wrong at any point. I also agree with Devon that Strawson admits up front that he is not answering the question about what the thesis of determinism is. He even begins by stating, "some philosophers say they do not know what the thesis of determinism is," then explains that he is of this "party of those who do not know what the thesis of determinism is" (72).
Yet, despite his inability to answer questions about what the thesis is, he does attempt to reconcile the parties of people who believe that they do know what the thesis is, referring to one party as "the pessimists," one as "the optimists," and then he presents a third party he refers to as "the moral skeptics" (72). He focuses primarily on the optimists and pessimists. The pessimists, he holds, believe that if determinism is true, then "moral obligation and responsibility really have no application," thus all blame for action is "unjustified" (72). On the other side, the optimists, he explains, hold that even if the thesis is true, blame is still justified. Lastly, the skeptics, he explains, argue that guilt is "confused" whether or not the thesis is true or false (72).
While he does not fall into any of these three categories, his aim is to reconcile optimism and pessimism. Even though he does not know what the thesis of determinism is, he claims that he can study the position of the accounts and find a sort of hybrid which allows the “facts as we know them” to be taken into account (73). By doing so, he ultimately concludes that we must reject the pessimistic view of determinism for its inability to account for these interpersonal personal reactive views. Yet, he also claims that optimists go to far, thus the optimistic view must “return for a substantial concession” (72). He explains that guilt in all situations can go to far; he explains that the pessimist is correct in asserting that using guilt “solely as instruments of policy” are “methods of individual treatment and social control” (89). Thus, relying too heavily on objective attitudes would result in an “at least partial and temporary withdrawal of goodwill” because we would be altogether too focused on social utility.
Hi Bria, Devon and Ellen! I too found this reading challenging and confusing, but I think we are on the right track in (hopefully) figuring out his argument. Like Devon highlighted, Strawson attempts to get around the idea of defining the terms of determinism by altering the question. He does so by admitting that even though we do not know exactly what determinism is, what we do know is “there must be a sense of ‘determined’ such that, if that thesis is true, then all behaviour whatever is determined that sense” (80). Under this condition, Strawson narrows us in to consider certain questions that the exact definition of determinism becomes irrelevant.
ReplyDeleteBria, I definitely agree that Strawson states that interpersonal commitments is inherent to what makes us human. These interpersonal commitments illustrate the complex relationship between participant and objective attitudes. To further trace out his argument, I think it is important for us to discuss the tension between participant and objective attitudes. Strawson sets up a contrast between the two. He defines the objective attitude as viewing another human, “as an object of social policy; as a subject for what, in a wide range of sense, might be called treatment” (79) and participant attitude as “essentially natural human reactions to the good or ill will or indifference of others toward us, as displayed in their attitudes and actions” (80). From the objective manner, you are unable to enter into an appropriate interaction with this person. Thus, interpersonal commitments are largely founded on participant attitudes. Strawson argues that to completely neglect participant objectives in favor of the opposite would be generally be implausible, “A sustained objectivity of inter-personal attitude, and the human isolation which that would entail, does not seem to be something of which human beings would be capable, even if some general truth were a theoretical ground for it” (81). It seems to me that the participant attitude is more fundamental than its objective counterpart in creating interpersonal commitments.
Hi everyone! This expanding on others' posts is so helpful!
ReplyDeleteTierra: "It seems to me that the participant attitude is more fundamental than its objective counterpart in creating interpersonal commitments." I wanted to discuss this part of your awesome comment! I think your intuition is right, but a lot of what Strawson discussed wtihin objectifying interpersonal interactions resonated with me well, especially when it came to his analysis of children. He holds: "[Parents] are dealing with creatures who are potentially and increasingly capable both of holding, and being objects of, the full range of human and moral attitudes, but are not yet truly capable of either" (88). Therefore, parents must constantly shift between "objectivity of attitude and developed human attitudes" (88). To me, this shifting expands well beyond just children: aren't we constantly deciding if someone warrants our resentment or not? Aren't we constantly shifting between a more objective attitude and a participant attitude? For example, if your friend does something that you resent, aren't you looking to objectify it on behalf of reasons that don't matter wtihin your relationship: "She's had a bad week," or "Her parents are having trouble," or "Her grandparent is in the hospital." I certainly find myself doing this on the behalf of myself and my friends, so I'm not sure which is more fundamental to creating interpersonal commitments. Don't we rely on this very practice to define what really lies at the core of a person and trying to parse out what doesn't really represent them as a person? I'm agreeing with your comment that interpersonal commitments is inherent to what makes us human, but I believe those interpersonal commitments may rely on the practice of objectification in a maybe even equally fundamental way.
Just a thought!