In Chapter 6, Sen argues that the capability of political
freedom as exercised through the democratic process of discussing, voting,
criticizing, debating, dissenting, and protesting is crucial to development
because it the only way states will be able to form their own values and
priorities. Sen also asserts that we cannot take claims about state tradition
and differences in the state’s ethical values from those of the “West”
seriously because these claims, often made by the state’s political leaders and
not the people themselves, do not originate via public discussion and
deliberation. For Sen, “we cannot… take preferences as given independently of
public discussion, that is, irrespective of whether open debates and
interchanges are permitted or not” as legitimate (153). So Sen will only
recognize values that arise out of the exercise of political capabilities as
those displaying state preference.
However, Sen doesn’t really believe in state preference but
rather assumes that the democratic process will exhibit an “emergence of new
values” which conform to a specific set of objective preferences, so long as
all people in society are given the ability to freely exercise their political
capabilities (153). In Chapter 10, Sen appears confident that if “different
sections of society (and not just the socially privileged) [in a developing
nation] should be able to be active in the decisions regarding what to preserve
and what to let go” of their traditional cultures, they would decide that vast
majority of their old values should be left behind (242). For to Sen, all democratic
deliberation would come to a desire for human rights and capabilities as
freedoms, regardless of cultural background.
Yet, from Sen’s examples of democracy in both the U.S. and
Europe, public discussion, deliberation, and voting has not resulted in a vast
expansion of human capabilities but the creation of state preferences valuing
some capabilities over others. We have formulated different priorities than
Europe has: “American social ethics seems to find it possible to be very non-supportive
of the indigent and impoverished, in a way that a typical Western European,
reared in a welfare state, finds hard to accept. But the same American social
ethics would find the double-digit levels of unemployment, common in Europe, to
be quite intolerable” (95). For Sen, these differences reflect differing deficiencies
of our respective nations to correct for particular failures of basic
capabilities. But these deficiencies arrive out of the democratic process
itself. We vote, and these are the preferences we come up with. I do believe
that if you sent out a poll, most people in the U.S. would say that it would be
good for all people to have access to benefits given under a welfare state, if
no strings were attached and we were only thinking in ideological terms.
However, as soon as the logistics of how to pay for these programs comes up,
voters democratically choose to divert from Sen’s objective capabilities of
what all people should have to a
valuing process exhibiting preferences. Does this mean that Sen must recognize
state preferences, even those limiting the basic capabilities of some of its
citizens as legitimate? Or is this a gap in Sen’s argument that his requirement
of objectivity leaves unanswered?
Hey Bria, very interesting post! I do not think that Sen must recognize state preferences that limit basic capabilities, because he would just argue that in these contexts, it is the failings of the practice of democracy rather than democracy itself that leads to these deficient outcomes. Sen is sure to point out that "the achievements of democracy depend not only on the rules and procedures that are adopted and safeguarded, but also on the way the opportunities are used by the citizens." (155.) I don't think it's too hard to argue that the American democratic process has some severe issues in representing the actual values of the American people. For example, Sen points out issues such as "the low percentage of voting in American elections, especially by African Americans, and other signs of apathy and alienation" (155.)
ReplyDeleteI think you are definitely right to point out that if the American people were polled about a welfare state, many would voice support on a purely ideological basis. However, I don't think it is voters that largely divert from what you call "Sen’s objective capabilities of what all people should have." Rather, the corrupting influence of money and special interests in our political system is what diverts our democratic choices away from our true values and preferences. Were our democratic system to be reformed, I see no reason to think the focus would not be on human rights and freedom.
Hey Guys!
ReplyDeleteLove this post -- the failings of democracy is such a fun topic. In response to Devon:
Sen might argue that "in these contexts, it is the failings of the practice of democracy rather than democracy itself that leads to these deficient outcomes," but it is unclear to me that that argument is sufficient. We do have low voter turnout, especially compared to other developed democracies, but the effects that this has on our substantive policy decisions is unclear. While journalists love to write articles about how increasing voter turnout would guarantee wins for democrats, most of the scholarship actually shows that increasing voter turnout has minimal effects on actual outcomes. Here's a nice aljazeera article that pieces together some studies and quotes to make very strong claims:
http://america.aljazeera.com/opinions/2015/3/progressives-need-to-stop-looking-for-a-hero.html. Here are two academic papers that comment on the significance of scholarship that proves that there would be minimal impact on increasing turnout and make similar findings (aka Democrats might fare better but outcomes wouldn't change):
http://home.gwu.edu/~jsides/turnout.pdf
http://www.law.uchicago.edu/files/file/536-324-jg-voters.pdf
A highlight:
"one obvious interpretation is that these results are of a piece with the conventional view that outcomes would not change importantly if everyone voted (e.g., Highton and Wolfinger 2002; Citrin et al. 2003)."
With regard to the campaign finance argument -- I am much less familiar with the literature on this topic, but a quick google search found that it seems like there are also minimal effects of campaign finance reform on actual outcomes:
http://people.umass.edu/schaffne/laraja_schaffner_spendingbans.pdf
Given these studies, we have to face the idea that our voting patterns might actually accurately represent our attitudes towards issues like welfare. Which takes away the argument to just fall back on our democratic failings. Perhaps we can say that not enough Americans vote so we don't have to take their opinions seriously, but this assumes that outcomes would change if more people voted. Perhaps the argument falls back on some baseline for democratic legitimacy (I personally am in favor of mandatory voting) but still Sen seems to be arguing that our actual opinions will support certain objective truths.
So we fall back to Ellen's question: Does this mean that Sen must recognize state preferences, even those limiting the basic capabilities of some of its citizens as legitimate? Or is this a gap in Sen’s argument that his requirement of objectivity leaves unanswered?
Oops! Bria's question!
DeleteHey guys, this thread is great. Bria, I think you do well to point out the importance of deliberation in Sen's scheme, but I'm unsure about the conclusions you draw in the second paragraph of your post. You write that Sen "assumes that the democratic process will exhibit an 'emergence of new values' which conform to a specific set of objective preferences." However, I'm not sure Sen requires convergence on a "specific set of objective preferences," besides for securing participatory freedoms, which are intrinsically important. Indeed, on the same page you quote, Sen posits that, "A proper understanding of what economic needs are -- their content and their force -- requires discussion and exchange" (153). He goes on to explain that our conception of needs relates to our ideas of "the preventable nature of some deprivations" and "what can be done about them" (154).
ReplyDeleteI'm not sure where you found the bit on leaving the vast majority of old values behind (on 241, though, Sen writes that the society can "preserve old forms of living...even at significant economic cost"). However, even if Sen says what you are quoting, this cannot mean he's shedding the importance of culture and variation among people -- it's a central part of his theory. To me, it's clear that in determining the specifics, public priorities are determined by value judgements among a particular polity (110). Thus, as a society (Palestinians in Jerusalem for example) might value access to a religious holy site more than economic opportunity when given the choice. In much the same vein, it is just as feasible that a society might place more emphasis on economic capabilities than it places on treatment for disabled persons (so long as these persons still have participatory freedoms). It is the society which must choose which capabilities to emphasize, and Sen sees this as one of the strengths of his account.