Say You're Bipolar -- Can You Feel Love?

I want to start by saying I really liked how Strawson formulated a theory of moral accountability with its root in our actual human relationships, eliminating rationality/the pessimists' metaphysics from the equation. The conciliatory nature of the piece was brilliantly done, and by the end of class, we might end up with a Mo who isn't going to make the free will objection every damn day. That said, let's talk about love (shoutout to Cesco).

As many of the posts have already discussed, Strawson makes a distinction between agents who should be viewed objectively (from a moral responsibility point of view) and those who are capable of inter-personal relationships as he understands them. The objective attitude "may include repulsion or fear, it may include pity or even love, though not all kinds of love...[but] it cannot include resentment, gratitude, forgiveness...or [reciprocal love between two adults]" (79).

When somebody is "warped or deranged" or simply a child, we tend to "set him apart from normal participant reactive attitudes," and insofar as we modify our outlook toward the agent, we find moral condemnation to be a fundamentally inept response to actions she takes (79). On the other hand, those who are capable of ordinary inter-personal relationships can be held accountable from a moral point of view, because to be normal in the sense "precisely is being exposed to the [full] range of reactive attitudes and feelings that is in question" (81).

My question, then, has to do with somebody who is bipolar: when in a manic phase (which is can range from a few hours to a few months...I mean to discuss the latter case), people with this condition are often viewed as "something to be understood and controlled in the most desirable fashion...as a matter of policy...or treatment" (82). By creating the two categories, Strawson seems to be suggesting that one who is viewed with this objective attitude -- somebody experiencing a manic episode -- is incapable of love, moral indignation, resentment, and guilt.

I think this is patently absurd, and reject it on its face; in this case, there are ways in which we treat or "control" the person, but she is still entirely capable of having a mutual loving relationship. Married couples do it all the time, and indeed, living through this disorder constitutes what many would call an even more powerful bond between two persons. While Strawson tries to account for these sorts of cases by discussing the "continuum" of attitudes, his distinction really falls apart here. If you accept that the person is both capable of the full range of reactive attitudes AND to be viewed objectively, the basis for viewing her objectively no longer obtains. Of course, then I'm left uncertain about if this person can be the object of my moral indignation.