Looking at the rest of the blog, it seems like everyone struggled a lot with this reading. I definitely did. I kind of just wrote out what I think his argument is, and then pose a question he may have answered.
Because we are unwilling to give up our commitment to interpersonal interactions, we cannot give up our morally reactive attitudes. If I am unable to divorce myself from my commitment to interpersonal interactions, then whether or not determinism is true, it wouldn't really change my behavior. We would still be committed to holding people morally accountable, because that commitment underlies our interpersonal interactions.
The only times we don't hold people accountable are when it falls into the two categories that Strawson poses: they had no other choice, and it was an accident (they didn't know etc.). This fits with our moral intuitions, as we don't hold children to the same moral standards as we hold each other. We don't blame the child who clogs the toilet with crayons because they didn't know that would clog the toilet. But the child is the easy example, and there are many instances I can think of that aren' cut and dry.
This reading made me think of an excellent podcast by Radiolab called blame. Here is the link: http://www.radiolab.org/story/317421-blame/
In it, they discuss the story of a man who had a surgery that removed part of his brain to stop his seizures. After the surgery, the man became addicted to internet porn, and specifically child pornography. He was arrested and tried. The question circles around whether or not we can hold this man responsible. In many ways, he was himself, he went to work and maintained the semblance of a normal life. But he also showed signs that he was drastically different.
If we take Strawson seriously, the moral intuitions that we use to decide whether or not someone can be held accountable make up the basis of our reactive attitudes and therefore our commitment to interpersonal interactions. He acknowledges that he deals in crude dichotomies to make his point -- and this question definitely doesn't undermine his account -- but it asks for explanation. What do we do in the gray areas in which our moral intuitions don't give us a clear answer for when someone is morally accountable for their action?
Melissa,
ReplyDeleteFirst I didn't know that children clogging the toilet with crayons was a common occurrence...perhaps there is an interesting story to be shared in seminar today???
Second, and more seriously, thank you for laying out your interpretation of his argument. I agree with your layout of Strawson's discussion of morality and freedom, and it helped me understand it better. In response to your question on grey areas, I am not sure that there is an easy answer. The example you brought up of the man who becomes addicted to child pornography is certainly a niche example, but I do think it highlights the issue of grey areas. Ones where it the person is not entirely at fault for their moral missteps, but also not entirely innocent. The issue of trying teens as adults in violent crimes comes to mind as an even better example than the one you propose. What is the legal system to do when you have a 17 year old, someone just a year away from being a legal adult, commit a crime. They are clearly different than a child. They most likely do know better, but we also note that they are not fully developed and more susceptible to outside influences. How much of a difference does one year make, though; especially in boys whose brains aren't fully developed until well into their twenties.
These grey areas are certainly difficult situations, and I am not entirely sure what we do with them either. Enforcing a set legal limit seems arbitrary and incapable of dealing with the specific nuanced details of each case that applies to these outliers.
I'm 100% on board with your approach Melissa, so I'm going to try and make a point that I hope relates to your post, and we'll see if something sticks (or not).
ReplyDeleteSir Strawson's handling of the modifier 'moral' struck me as odd, and perhaps internally incongruent. He touches on what does and does not qualify as moral briefly, saying: "it is this impersonal or vicarious character of the attitude, added to its others, which entitle it to the qualification 'moral'." (84)
This seems to me to be a Smithian way of classifying what gets to be moral. By setting the bar for moral sentiments such that others must be able to arrive at the same conclusion (impersonal), I feel like he is almost approximating the impersonal spectator. Later he also adds, when referring to sentiments such as responsibility and guilt: "they do so in proportion as they are strong; and their strength is in general proportioned to what is felt to be the magnitude of the injury" (90)
In extrapolating this (hopefully correct) view of how Strawson applies the term 'moral', it then seems that he implicitly is setting certain limits on what is and is not moral.
However, I am unsure about how this view of morality impacts his view of 'participant reactive attitudes'. He first raises the issue of morality when discussing 'generalised or vicarious analogues of the personal reactive attitudes'(84), but earlier affirms that these generalised attitudes are kindred attitudes to participant reactive attitudes (83), which would seem to imply that these moral requirements apply there too.
I'm not sure if this really matter for his theory or not, but it seemed to me that this may illuminate some of his reasoning, particularly as pertains to his handling of objectivity and how that relates to humanity.
Hopefully we can sort this mess out together.