Free riders and non-participating countries

Hi everyone. I have a question about the free riders possibility Pogge brings up at the very end of section 8. Pogge infers that it is likely that not all countries will sign on to his plan, displaying that the costs of the plan will be extremely low even if “countries representing two-thirds of the global product… refuse to join” (37). He then states, “It is true: If the plan’s benefits to users, manufacturers, and inventors of new medicines and to public health are global, then some countries could be free-riders,” by which I assume he means that individuals in these countries would be able to receive generic priced drugs covered by the plan’s agreement without contributing to the financial incentives for pharmaceutical companies (37). But I do not think that Pogge is very clear as to what he means here. I do not think he could consider countries that are the primary recipients of generically produced essential medicines to be “free riders,” even if their governments do not financially contribute to the plan. Developing countries are less likely to invest in the plan and sign on to something that will require excess expenses, and to solve this problem, Pogge proposes a reduced cost system based on per-capita income combined with other factors such as percentage of global product. So countries that participate this way cannot be considered free riders because their participation and reduced cost is effectively implemented into the plan. Additionally, because “the GBD patent regime would exclude the biotechnology, pharmaceutical, and generic companies of non-participating countries,” I do not understand how countries could be free riders because all countries who are not given an exemption from the financial investment portion will be required to pay for it or will otherwise be excluded (37). So my first question is a clarifying one: who are the free-riders here? 

Additionally, I have an issue with the allowance of governments to opt out of the plan, though I realize that requiring all governments to comply is also an extreme act of coercion and raises further problems. However, if countries (especially developing ones) are allowed to refuse participation in Pogge’s agreement, it is quite possible that some countries in need of a reduction of GBD will decide not to participate because of associated political affiliations or attached strings that are not in line with the effective power in the country’s preferences. According to Pogge, “it is… an accepted principle that those exercising effective power in a country are entailed to act on behalf of its people,” (13). But if a state desperately in need of reducing the GBD decides to opt out, should the global community exclude this country from the plan’s benefits, even if the government of this country is not a legitimate one, or should the global community provide generic drug prices to individuals within the state regardless of whether political leaders have officially agreed to the GBD plan? I believe that the global community should provide generic drugs in these situations, regardless of whether the state has officially agreed to the plan. Perhaps this is what Pogge means by free riding? But in these cases, I would argue that it is not the recipients of the drugs who are free riding, but the political regimes.