I had a hard time in this reading reconciling Rawls’
limited view of international justice with his more egalitarian view of
domestic justice. Nagel explains, “[Rawls’] two principles of justice are
designed to regulate neither the personal conduct of individuals living in a
just society, nor the governance of private associations, nor the international
relations of societies to one another, but only the basic structure of separate
nation-states” (123). Thus, Nagel explains that, “Rawls’s egalitarianism
does not apply either to individual morality or to individual outcomes within
the bounds of an egalitarian state” (123). In principle, it seems highly
inconsistent to me for Rawls to advocate for the veil of ignorance and the
difference principle domestically and then for him to almost entirely ignore
those values on an international scale. In A Theory of Justice,
on a domestic scale, Rawls prioritizes efforts to diminish arbitrary factors in
our lives. Yet, as Nagel admits, “the accident of being born in a poor
rather than a rich country is as arbitrary a determinant of one’s fate as the
accident of being born into a poor rather than a rich family in the same
country” (119). Thus, it seems to be counter to Rawls’ main ideals that a
factor this arbitrary is ignored.
While, I think perhaps it may be more feasible to apply Rawls’ principles on a domestic scale, I was
disappointed by his lack of moral consistency.
Nagel seems to defend Rawls’ position by explaining that “further
requirements of equal treatment depend on a strong condition of associative
responsibility, that such responsibility is created by specific and contingent
relations such as fellow citizenship, and that there is no general moral
requirement to take responsibility for other by getting into these sorts of
relations with as many of them as possible” (125). While humanitarian claims should compel us to
bring those out of unlivable situations, once livable standards are met, the
political conception of justice would dictate that we have no other reason to
help those worse off than we are. This
idea disappointed me because of Rawls’ emphasis is to help those worse off. Why
should this need to help the worse-off end at the borders of our nation? In a John Oliver clip this week, he discussed
the Syrian Refugee Crisis, and mocked the rhetoric that we can claim we ought
to “Love your neighbor as yourself” and then asterisk that statement by
precluding our individual nation. To me,
Rawls’ inconsistency is not that different from this sentiment. How can he ignore “the gruesome fact of
injustice” in our world and apply his difference principle only to his most
immediate neighbors (aka those in our country) (118)? Moreover, if he claims that perhaps we only
have “specific and contingent relations” to our fellow citizens, what happens
when trade and new technology bring close relations with those who may live far
from ourselves? What if I technology allows
me to feel just as close to someone in a foreign country than someone in my
own? Regardless, is this even a fair
consideration because these factors are arbitrary and counter to his principles?
Hi Ellen! Great post! I was too equally dissatisfied with Rawls’ limitation of justice on a domestic level. If Rawls is mainly concerned with helping the worse off, the difference principle should extend not only to our community, but internationally as well. Nagel’s distinction between humanitarian and justice point of view provides some sort of reasoning for why the need to help the worse-off only applies domestically. As you highlight, justice is interested in the comparative differences within a society while the humanitarian perspective cares about the “absolute rather than the relative level of need of the people” (119). Although Rawls focuses on improving the position of the worst off, the need to help the worse off is contained within our borders because justice concentrates on the relative, not absolute, well-being. Thus, we should direct our aid towards fellow citizens rather than those in the developing world. Nagel furthers his definition of the political conception by arguing that the demand to help others is limited domestically because we only possess an “associative obligation” to those within our state (121). He asserts that, “Justice is something we owe through our shared institutions only to those with whom we stand in a strong political relation” (121). The associative obligation places justice as a mechanism to pursue self-interest. According to the political conception, it is unsettling to view justice instrumentally in this Hobbesian notion.
ReplyDeleteI also really like your extension of Nagel’s “special and contingent relationship” regarding globalization. Trade and technology enables individuals from around the world to develop “a duty of justice” towards with one another (121). Since Nagel places a considerable emphasis on this relationship developing from a sovereign power, I would argue that this form of justice would not be valued in the same significance as the domestic form of justice with fellow citizens.
Hey Guys!
ReplyDeleteI thought Nagel's argument on this point was really interesting. A couple key points that I though were cool about his argument were his definition of justice, the units (people or nation states etc.) that we are working with, and the monism/dualism argument.
He ties justice with sovereignty as a purely political virtue. Things like humanitarian efforts are lumped elsewhere. "Without the enabling condition of sovereignty to confer stability on just institutions, individuals however morally motivated can only fall back on pure aspiration for justice that has no practical expression" (116). This sentence struck me as odd at first, because like you guys, I immediately thought about the difference one person can make around the world in a humanitarian sense, like using technology to develop relationships with people in other countries. But I guess because, "justice as ordinarily understood requires more than mere humanitarian assistance to those in desperate need, and injustice can exist without anyone being on the verge of starvation" (118) these humanitarian efforts would not impact justice. So in that sense, even if "technology allows me to feel just as close to someone in a foreign country than someone in my own" that wouldn't impact justice under his definition (Ellen).
Then he goes on and talks about the units being considered by global justice -- which is important because there are different principles of justice for different units, according to his monistic/dualistic argument. Which is where I get confused and was hoping for some help.
ReplyDeleteHe seems to only consider the obligations of the nation-state, which have a different quality than the obligations of the individual. He gives that example of taking on obligations as something like marriage, we are born with some obligations (to fellow citizens) but not to others, like people in different countries. These are obligations that individuals would have. "Every state has the boundaries and population is has for all sorts of accidental reasons; but given that it exercises sovereign power over its citizens and in their name, those citizens have a duty of justice towards one another through the legal social and economic institutions that sovereign power makes possible" (121).
But the unit he is actually working with is nation states. He says that monism requires that "any plausible overall political/moral view must, at the fundamental level, evaluate the justice of institutions with normative principles that apply also to people's choice" (122). Ellen -- I think this is your view. You are frustrated with Rawls' lack of moral consistency, and want the principle that applies to individuals to also apply to nation states. I kind of like the monism/dualism distinction thought. Nagel's response is essentially that "different principles apply to different types of entities" (122). He argues that "Rawls must resist the charge that moral consistency requires him to take individuals as the moral units in a conception of global justice. To do so would make a huge difference, for it would mean that applying the principles of justice within the bounds of the nation-state was at best a practical stop gap" (125). So again, Nagel insists that the units of global justice are nation-states (because of his sovereignty/justice argument) and not individuals. But didn't it seem like all of the set up for obligations between one another were at the individual level? It seems like he's making all these comparisons with individual obligations of justice, but insisting that obligations of justice vary based on the unit being used. He even switches back to using individuals right after that quote: "The defense of the political conception of justice would have to hold that beyond the basic humanitarian duties, further requirements of equal treatment depend on a strong condition of associative responsibility, that such responsibility is created by specific and contingent relations such as fellow citizenship, and that there is no general moral requirement to take responsibility for other by getting into those sorts of relations with as many of them as possible" (125).
Summary: Some quick responses to Ellen. Also, he critiques monism arguing that different principles of justice or morality apply to different things (like nation-states or individuals) but he bases a lot of his argument for the obligations of nation-states on comparing them to individuals. This seems weird to me.