Wednesday, April 20, 2016

Broadening Informational Bases... A Lot

I really enjoyed this reading and thought that Sen levied powerful critiques of many commonly held conceptions of development.

This post is sort of arguing for an insufficiency in the evaluative capacity of Sen's capability approach. Since we've only read three chapters, it is possible that the insufficiency is solved elsewhere in the book, or I might be misunderstanding Sen. Basically this might be irrelevant. But here we go...

Sen starts off chapter 3 by presenting a story. "Annapurna wants someone to clear up the garden, which has suffered from past neglect, and three unemployed laborers -- Dinu, Bishanno and Rogini -- all very much want the job" (54).  Dinu is the poorest, Bishanno is the psychologically worst off, and Rogini has a chronic ailment that could be solved with the money from working. Sen then poses the question, who should Annapurna hire? This highlights the shortcomings in other approaches quite powerfully. If we only focus on income, we hire Dinu, but that doesn't seem like it takes everything relevant into account. Same goes for Rogini and Bishanno. Depending on what information the develpment metric deems relevant, we come to different conclusions. Each metric (utilitarianism, libertarianism etc.) has a different informational base that help explain the vastly different conclusions that they draw. So Sen argues that in order to effectively evaluate development, we have to broaden our informational base.

Sen points out that the problem that occurs when we broaden our informational base is that we have to have some explicit way of evaluating He acknowledges, "There can be substantial debate on the particular functionings that should be included in the list of important achievements and the corresponding capabilities. This valuational issues is inescapable in an evaluative exercise of this kind, and one of the main merits of the approach is the need to address these judgmental questions in an explicit way, rather than hiding them in some implicit framework" (75). Sen then provides a technical representation for evaluation. He puts forth the functioning vector, and people's achievements. But then he also acknowledges that these evaluations need weights. Otherwise how will we make judgments between them? Especially in cases like the one he posed at the beginning when there will clearly be tradeoffs. We know that with regard to certain functionings "some are more important than others" (76). There can't be a homogenous metric like utility or income, since "heterogeneity of factors that influence individual advantage is a pervasive feature of actual evaluation" (77). So we are still waiting for how to evaluate -- then finally he tells us "there has to be some kind of reasoned 'consensus' on weights, or at least on a range of weights. This is a 'social choice' exercise, and it rquires public discussion and a democratic understanding and acceptance. It is not a special problem that is associated only with the use of the functioning space" (78-79). So his solution for evaluation is to have reasoned discussion and have people come to a consensus about what capabilities are more important. He has broadened the informational base to the point that people all discuss and in theory come to conclusions. Does this strike anyone else as unrealistic at the practical level? What does this reasoned public debate look like? What defines the communities that are deciding?

He ends this chapter by saying "Euclid is supposed to have told Ptolemy: there is no 'royal road' to geometry. It is not clear that there is any royal road to evaluation of economic or social policies either" (85). Which is especially clear when we think about Sen's original problem: which laborer do we hire? At the end of the chapter, I still have no idea. How do we go about answering the tough questions when it comes to tradeoffs in development? As individuals, we can make personal value judgements, and as groups we have to discuss and conclude. Either way, I don't know how to evaluate the tough questions any better than when I started. I suppose this is a problem with all the alternatives (which is part of Sen's point) but for me to be convinced, I want his approach to be functionally better than the others. But I sort of feel like Sen has broadened the information base to the point that it holds more fidelity in theory but is practically unhelpful.

(This is sort of a separate issue, so I'll put it in paraentheses at the bottom. But was anyone else confused when he argued that under the Rawlsian conception of primary goods, "a person who is disabled may have a larger basket of primary goods and yet have less chance to lead a normal life that an able-bodied person with a smaller basket of primary goods" (74)? He writes on 72, "Indeed primary goods themselves are mainly various types of general resources, and the use of these resources to generate the ability to do valuable things is subject to much of the same list of variations ... etc." basically we should focus on actual living. But Rawls judged primary goods based on what people have reason to want (surfer vs. doctor), and broadens the category of primary goods (as Sen later states) as "rights liberties, and, opportunities, income and wealth,  self-respect etc" (78). Rawls' inclusion of opportunities seems especially important here.Wouldn't this broadened understanding of Rawls help account for Sen's critique that primary goods provide an insufficient understanding of well-being? Why doesn't he acknowledge this?)

3 comments:

  1. Also, if we need democratic discussion to apply weights to understand how to approach development -- does that make these democratic conditions a prerequisite for deciding how to approach development in the first place? Otherwise we are using weights generated from other democratic societies and imposing them. Under this model, the conditions for democratic discussion would have to come first in order to determine how to develop? Wouldn't this seem odd if the tradeoff was people dying or disease or starvation -- having the conditions to dicuss which one to address first would require implementing those conditions first. This seems weird. Am I misconstruing?

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  2. Hey Melissa! I'm glad you brought this up because it was one of my biggest problems with the theory as well. I love that you brought it back to the laborer example, because I do think it still remains somewhat unclear. I know that he both requires participatory freedom and accounts for subjective approaches (culture, tradition, etc) in defining a particular society's informational basis for evaluation, but I'm also not sure how it's going to shake out. At the very least, making this judgement at the "practical level" is going to require some extrapolation and thorough optimism in the democratic process.

    With regard to your second concern (in the comment) about democratic conditions as a prerequisite, I actually think Sen is okay on this front. Participatory freedom is indeed necessary to come up with a society's informational basis, but Sen would probably say we'd accept no other approach. On this, let's go back to his discussion of markets and the "intrinsic value" of freedom. We value "free choice" over "submission to order" because of the distinction between culmination outcomes and comprehensive (process-considering) outcomes. The reason we would not be okay with a dictator setting up our market scheme exactly how it is now (except that it would be a fully centralized system) is the fact that this would not allow us to interact economically with each other. This is the "central value of freedom itself", and we all intuitively think there is "something lost" without participatory freedom in PROCESS. Thus, we're going to have a whole lot of societies that don't have Sen's background conditions for freedom, and before we can allow for country-specific selection of freedoms, we have to establish people's ability to participate.

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  3. Hey Mo! Thanks for your response. I'm still a little confused though I think about how Sen can reconcile that (your explanation of why that would be ok) with his critique of Rawls.

    He argues that Rawlsian focus on freedom is a weakness of the theory aka the primacy of the right over the good. This asymmetry and focus on process instead of outcomes is troubling for Sen. He indeed does consider process valuable "in the context of the constitutive role of liberty and political and civil rights in making it possible to have public discourse and communicative emergence of agreed norms and social values (65) -- as you said. But, his problem with asymmetry of process over outcome is shown by "demonstrating the force of other considerations, including that of economic needs. Why should the status of intense economic needs, which can be matters of life and death, be lower than that of personal liberties... If the 'priority of liberty' is to be made plausible even in the context of countries that are intensely poor, the content of that priority would have to be, I would argue considerably qualified. This does not, however, amount to saying that liberty should not have priority, but rather that the form of that demand should not have the effect of making economic needs be easily overlooked" (64).

    So it seems that in the case of life and death considerations, liberty is not the priority -- we must address the economic needs first. So again we have the question, if we do not have liberty (of democratic conversation) in these situations to discuss which weights to apply to different capabilities -- how do we even go about addressing them?

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