In section 32, Rawls illuminates the fundamental tensions
between liberty and equality and how the “two-part basic structure allows a reconciliation”
between the two. He holds that the first principle enumerates the liberties,
and the second affects “the worth of liberty, the value to individuals of the
rights that the first principle defines” (204). He says the difference principle
corrects for the fact that “worth of liberty is not the same for everyone. Some
have greater authority and wealth, and therefore greater means to achieve their
aims” (204). He clarifies that “compensating for the lesser worth of freedom is
not to be confused with making good an unequal liberty” (205). What does Rawls
mean by “making good an unequal liberty”? Does he mean that even while
operating under the difference principle, this will not completely excuse for
or completely correct for an unequal society? What would we need in order to “make
good” an “unequal liberty”? Would operating under the difference principle for
a long period of time finally achieve an end where there are no unequal
liberties, where the “worth” of the liberties described in the first principles
could be equally defined and realized by all? Or does liberty within our
current governmental system in and of itself legitimate inequality, as Marx
would say, and can it never be fully corrected for or “made good”?
I’m excited to shed light on this interesting point of
tension during our discussion at The Press tomorrow!
I think your post talks to something that came up in my tutorial with Cesco. Rawls is not concerned with correcting the initial distribution of assets (both social and natural abilities) as much as he is concerned with correcting the resulting effects of this initial unequal distribution. To Rawls, if one person had two perfectly functioning eyes and the other none the appropriate solution would be to set up a system that would allow the person with eyes to prosper in such a manner as benefitted the person without eyes. To me, this is what Rawls mean on 205 when he says: “compensating for the lesser worth of freedom is not to be confused with making good an unequal liberty”. Instead of addressing the unequal liberty (being born into poverty, not being that smart, etc.) Rawls aims to address the effects of that position. We would provide opportunities for the person born into poverty to overcome their background through education, extra-curricular activities etc.
ReplyDeleteTo address your second point, operating under the difference principle would only mitigate the effects of being born poor or blind, the difference principle would not prevent either. Being born rich would still be an advantage over being born poor, we would just have minimised the effect of the difference. Marx would definitely call this out as a structure that legitimates oppression, but I have to agree with Rawls and say that this is the best we can achieve. Absolute equality is not possible. This does not mean we shouldn’t attempt to approximate it as much as possible (with sacrificing too much), but it simply means that we need to be cognisant of the cost of some policies.
If a distribution were making good an unequal liberty, then it would be violating the lexical priority of the first principle, which mandates equal liberties, and allows for no trade offs that make good for inequalities in liberty. If it were addressing the unequal worth of equal liberties, that would be, in his view, a completely different, and potentially perfectly legitimate, thing.
ReplyDeleteso this distinction between unequal liberties (Boo) and unequal worth of liberties is extremely important.