My issue lies with the nature of these public places. Ripstein explores the nature of roads; 'Are roads like the high seas, uninhabitable zones that are available for all to traverse? Or are they somehow a residue of an original commons, the bit land that has not been appropriated.'(249) This is significant because the nature of the public space will determine how it is to be governed, and Ripstein argues 'It is not as though the road is already there, and then the rules are subsequently imposed. The road and the public rules regulating it comes as a package.'(249) This therefore allows the state to regulate the ways in which people utilize the roads, such that they must stop at a red light or go the correct direction on a one way street.
Ripstein goes further as to say that using the public space for private use is wrong. Public nuisances such as blocking the road are impermissible because 'it is an interference with the rights of members of the public, that is, private citizens coming and going as they please, making use of the road' (262) Ripstein uses Kant's examples of public nuisances to argue that other private uses of public spaces should be impermissible like begging or causing noise pollution or air pollution. However, he maintains that these public spaces still defend the basic liberties like the right to free speech even if this speech is seen as an inconvenience to people. My concern with this is where do the limits of our freedoms in public places begin and end? Ripstein does not make clear the distinction between liberties such as the freedom to express political views through speech in a public place despite its inconvenience, and other actions that he constitutes as public nuisances.
Kaamil,
ReplyDeleteI think Ripstein does not make a clear distinction between public exercises of free speech and public nuisances with clear intention. He says, "Given the role of public discourse in enabling the state to perfect itself, there is a structural pressure to err in the direction of classifying things as public" (264). I found this notion to be extremely compelling. He says that private speech is "comparatively rare" and that most speech "has a public dimension" (265). Although he doesn't necessarily draw a distinction, I believe this is a smart move, in that drawing a clear "line" between what is and what isn't public speech could present problematic exceptions. Instead, I think Ripstein would say that we would have to look at speech on a case by case basis, but always err on the side of public speech, since our democracy's health rests upon citizens speaking out against its failings.
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ReplyDeleteI had a similar question about when the limits of our freedoms begin and end, similar to Campbell's post also. It seems that a public nuisance is determined by the standards of the time, not by any objective moral judge. Any chance of public rules being determined arbitrarily seems to me to harm individual liberty. I wonder how Kant or Ripstein would respond to public street art. Such art clearly has a private purpose, but also has a public element of trying to spread a message. How is this morally different than someone standing in a public space, giving a speech about their political beliefs? Both may cause a 'public nuisance', but it seems that Ripstein would err on the side of protecting the speaker, but perhaps not the street art? What is the extent of freedom of expression? Is it literally only verbal speech?
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