Rawls and Contracts

Despite the fact that a society structured on the combination of the difference principle and fair equality of opportunity would most likely result in massive redistributions of property (most likely in the form of taxes), I think it’s extremely important to remember that Rawls is proposing a contract theory. Remember that this is the type of theory for government Locke proposed, even though Locke argued that we enter into society to protect our property from others taking it! Locke and Rawls clearly wouldn’t agree on what property individuals deserve and government’s role in maintaining these shares of property, but both philosophers start from similar grounds. Rawls states that the purpose of individuals forming society is “the cooperative venture of mutual advantage” (Rawls, 4). Locke almost says the same thing: “[t]he only way whereby any one divests himself of his natural liberty, and puts on the bonds of civil society, is by agreeing with other men to join and unite into a community for their comfortable, safe, and peaceable living one amongst another, in a secure enjoyment of their properties, and a greater security against any, that are not of it” (Locke, 52). Thus, for both Locke and Rawls, we form a society because we want to form one and because it is to our benefit to form one. This is just something to keep in mind because the concept of a contract theory is especially important for Rawls’s argument from The Original Position.

One of the most important aspects of the Original Position is that individuals, under the veil of ignorance, rationally choose the principles they wish to be governed by. They elect the principles they wish to guide their society without knowledge of their “place in society… [or] the particular circumstances of their own society ” (Rawls, 118). Further, Rawls argues that individuals must be committed principles chosen in the original position: “if we make an agreement, we have to accept the result; and so to give an undertaking in good faith, we must not only intend to honor it but with reason believe that we can do so” (159). Therefore, Rawls argues that institutions structured in accordance established principles are just because individuals willingly choose these principles “in relative equilibrium” and are committed to these principles (159). However, is it problematic if Rawls’s theory hinges on a contract that is “purely hypothetical” (104)? People cannot actually go behind the veil of ignorance, so how can we choose a set of principles to guide the structure of just government if we don’t actually have this option? Also, while Rawls’s argument from the Original Position is a fascinating thought experiment, even if we accept that Rawls’s two principles of justice would be chosen under the veil of ignorance, are we bound by contracts that are hypothetical? It seems problematic to be bound by a contract that we only would have agreed to in an imaginary situation. For in this case, individuals would not given the choice to elect their own contract, which is the fundamental idea of contract theory justifying government. Any ideas?