Ripstein states that mandatory
cooperation is an essential foundation for public provision. According to
Ripstein, cooperation becomes mandatory in the context of securing the
conditions for equal freedom, where no one is subject to another. Because the state has done its part, you are
obligated to do yours in compliance with public provision. For example, in the
case of roads, you have to follow traffic laws.
Due to its compulsive nature, I would argue that mandatory cooperation is
synonymous to coercion. Ripstein explains a striking similarity between
mandatory cooperation and coercion, “Where cooperation is mandatory, agreement
on terms is not even possible” (257). Like in coercion, your choices in
mandatory cooperation are limited to a point that the choice practically
becomes non-existent. Ripstein then invokes Kant in the description of
mandatory cooperation, “You are under an enforceable and unconditional
obligation to enter and remain in a rightful condition, and to provide for its
conditions; as such; you cannot attach terms to doing what you can already be
forced to do” (257-58). Kant’s description of mandatory cooperation is very
similar to an account of coercion because “you are under an enforceable and
unconditional obligation” to ensure the conditions of equal freedom (257-58). Mandatory
cooperation does not provide any opportunity for negotiation. As a result, you
are essentially forced to accept the certain terms set forth by mandatory
cooperation. Thus, mandatory cooperation limits freedom to a similar extent like in coercion.
If we generally
view coercion as bad and mandatory cooperation as similar to coercion, I wonder
why we willingly accept mandatory cooperation. Mandatory cooperation
implies that I am compelled to agree, whether it is my choice or not, to
certain regulations set forth by the state. Ripstein draws on Nozick’s argument
in his discussion of mandatory cooperation. According to Nozick, a patterned
principle aligns the distribution to fit a certain goal. To maintain the
pattern, the state would have to continuously or periodically interfere.
Therefore, a patterned distribution is incompatible with liberty. Since
mandatory cooperation limits our freedom “agreement on terms is not even
possible, “I would argue that mandatory cooperation is a type of continuous
interference used by the state to regulate our behavior, like in the case of distribution
(257). The state instills mandatory cooperation as a background condition to
establish a patterned principle of behavior in order to create and sustain a
system of equal freedom. If mandatory cooperation is a similar to a patterned
principle, does mandatory cooperation infringe on a person’s liberty as well?
I thought it was particularly interesting that Ripstein draws such a harsh contrast between private and public cooperation. Ripstein explains that “none of your long-term convenience, the convenience of others, or collateral benefits you receive entitle other private persons to compel you to enter into cooperative activities with them” (243). It is evident that Ripstein believes that coercion does not have a legitimate role in private relationships. Furthermore, he explains the Kantian account that “no private person can be compelled to serve the private purposes of another. Nor can a private person be compelled to serve the private purposes of several (or many other persons)” (242). Thus, a private individual cannot even be legitimately coerced if his or her actions were to benefit even millions of private individuals.
ReplyDeleteYet, Ripstein explains that the state has legitimate power greater than any individual or group of individuals could ever have. Thus, according to Ripstein, these legitimate state powers are entirely “sui generis and distinct” from the principles and obligation which govern the private lives. As opposed to having no obligation and no legitimate role of coercion in private relationships, public rules legitimately mandate that “everyone can be compelled to do his or her part” (243). Yet, Ripstein does acknowledge that the mitigating factor of this coercion is that each person has a representative in public law, although he acknowledges this role in not substantial enough to serve as an “approximation of private bargaining towards agreed terms” (238). Even if Ripstein believes that does not constitute a private contract-like situation, do you think, in our minds, we do see this role of elected officials as decreasing our sense that mandatory cooperation is coercion? Now that we have a stake in public law, do we feel as though we have brought our private interests into the public sphere, diminishing sentiment of being coerced?
I'm not sure if I agree that mandatory cooperation, especially of the form Ripstein presents, could be construed to be a patterned principle. Nozick defines a patterned principle as one that allocates holdings in accordance with a certain characteristic. On the other hand, Ripstein puts forth mandatory cooperation as a means of achieving personal freedom, particularly within the public domain. This personal freedom he speaks of is not a patterned principle, because it does not allocate holdings, rather it guarantees and reinforces the value of our private holdings. We need roads (according to Ripstein) so that we are at liberty to make use of our private holdings (he uses the example of parcels of land being locked in). Roads are merely an example of the public domain here, and it is only within the public domain that mandatory cooperation applies. You're just as free as you were before, within the confines of your own land, we're merely taking steps to ensure that you can legitimately profit from that land.
ReplyDeleteI'm posting this for Cesco because he's having technical difficulties.
ReplyDeleteHey Tierra!
I think Ripstein would argue that mandatory cooperation limits freedom only to ensure freedom. How one defines freedom/liberty is critical here, for if you mean absolute freedom, most (all?) social cooperation limits your right to do whatever you please. Ripstein defines one's rights as pertinent to oneself and her possessions, so it would appear that by mandating what side of the road I should drive my car on, my rights to decide how to use my body to guide my car are being infringed. Yet he defines the public domain to be much like another’s property in that one would be subject to the owner’s desires. But rather than arbitrary, even whimsical, rules set forth by a peer, regulation in the public domain is constricted by the strong condition that it ensures equal freedom for all. On page 243, Ripstein assures us that “principles governing mandatory cooperation only apply when mandatory cooperation is required by a system of equal freedom.” We should only experience mandatory cooperation when it is in place to ensure our equal rights, although Ripstein acknowledges that democratically elected bodies will not always abide by the principles they ought to. It might be worrisome that some will benefit more than others from these public goods, but they are in place to help one in the private interactions as well as public (roads to/from private property, markets, etc.).
I agree with Ellen and Cesco. I think it ultimately comes down to Ripstein’s justification of the state as a “public authority,” which means that the state is entitled to mandate individuals to act on behalf of citizens as a collective body (238).
ReplyDeleteRipstein thinks that a state that exercises its police power by restricting freedom only imposes on an individual’s right to choose what she may do with her property because it is necessary to ensure that the fundamental conditions for equal private freedom are met. Actaully, Ripstein argues that mandatory cooperation follows Kantian analysis because the state has extra powers as a public authority. He states, “[t]he key to the Kantian analysis is that the state, acting on behalf of the citizens as a collective body, has legitimate powers that neither individual citizens nor any group of them have apart form it” (243). Because the state is obligated to act on behalf of its citizens, the state must protect the individual liberties of its citizens as a collective body. Thus, the state is actually obligated to exercise its police power to enforce mandatory cooperation. So as long as the state acts on behalf of its citizens (who make their own laws), it actually has a responsibility to enforce mandatory cooperation in order to secure the fundamental conditions for equal private freedom. And this responsibility supersedes individual liberty.
The question, then, is whether the use of this police power for mandatory cooperation is coercive. I believe it is not. Throughout “Section II: Taking Roads Seriously,” Ripstein explains why his principles and use of mandatory cooperation provide the structure without which individuals would not be able to exercise equal liberty. Since mandatory cooperation is meant to strictly provide societal structure in order to secure each person’s freedom (though in practice this would call for a large expansion of the role of the state), I do not believe that the creation of this structure would be coercive.
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ReplyDeleteBria, I think you've done a good job of straightening Thomas out, although you don't explicitly say that's what you're doing; Ripstein doesn't view public roads as allowing us to "make use of our private holdings," but rather are a means to ensure that we are not "systematically subject to the choice of others." To be fair to Thomas, I think he was certainly right on the first part of his comment, demonstrating that roads are not really a patterned principle in Nozick's terms.
ReplyDeleteHowever, I’m going to disagree with you on the question of coercion. Kant claims we are each under an "enforceable and unconditional obligation" to "remain in a rightful condition, and to provide for its conditions." Ellen aptly pointed this out in her comment above. This rightful condition mandates that each person does her part in providing for public goods such as roads, public health, national defense, and political speech (mentioned in 260-264), because these commodities are "public preconditions for private freedom." While it does indeed enable the exercise of individual liberty, the system is not adopted voluntary. Being a part of this public system/not free-riding is simply something Kantian ethics posits we should do; as one element of his categorical imperative, Kant writes, “do not make yourself a mere means for others but be at the same time an end for them.” He is trying to set up a system which primarily serves to resolve collective action problems and secure the necessary pre-conditions for individual liberty.
What I think Ellen was pointing to was the fact that Kant (and therefore Ripstein) doesn’t even claim there’s an opt-out. Locke gives a similar reason for entering into a commonwealth -- we are giving up a few of our liberties in exchange for a more robust ability to exercise those that we retain -- but in his account, we could enter back into the State of Nature, so we are tacitly consenting to be a part of a commonwealth, which means we'll contribute to the creation of certain public goods. Rawls’ attempt to demonstrate consent is a little different, claiming that since we would all agree to certain provisions if placed in the Original Position, we can be seen as voluntarily consenting to the contract. Kant is essentially saying any society should pursue the "rightful condition," then he outlines ways for us to do that.
On a separate note, I think the influence of “normative philosophy” and the decisions of a “competent public authority” remains unclear; I’m not willing to say they carry huge weight, but they shouldn’t be completely discounted.
Mo, thank you for pointing this out. After thinking about it more, I actually think I agree with you. I think Ripstein would say that the state can act coercively in order to enforce mandatory cooperation. Further, I think he would say that this coercion is justified in order to create the structure necessary to ensure equal private liberty. This is because the state is obligated to create a fundamental structure in which all individuals are able to exercise freedom. And because the state's obligation to its citizens is prior to anything else, taking coercive measures when individuals do not comply with mandatory cooperation is just a necessary evil. Thank you again, Mo, for clarifying.
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