I really enjoyed this reading -- Beitz put forward a bunch of really interesting ideas that I'm excited to see how he develops. I have questions that I think I will hold off on asking until next seminar when we've read chapters 3,4, and 5.
I thought one of the coolest points in the reading was the importance of human rights as a moral language. In the preface, Beitz frames his book by discussing his decision not to write this book earlier: "That might not have been a mistake then, but it would be today. In the intervening years the language of human rights has become the common idiom of social criticism in global politics. That there should be wide acceptance of global critical standards for domestic political institutions is one part of what people mean when they speak of a “human rights revolution” in the last several decades" (xi). Beitz seems particularly interested in the language that we use to talk about rights because of the normative force of the language of human rights. He continues that, "The problem is that, although the idea and language of human rights have become increasingly prominent in public discourse, it has not become any more clear what kinds of objects human rights are supposed to be, why we should believe that people have them, or what follows from this belief for political practice" (xi). I find this last sentence especially interesting in retrospect because Beitz does not base his argument in trying to understand "what kinds of objects human rights are supposed to be." Instead, he focuses on the empirical fact that we developed human rights (and the associated language) as a normative force that gives us reasons to act. This empirical claim is largely based on the language that we use to talk about human rights, despite the fact that (aka other empirical claim) that people have different justifications for supporting the idea of human rights. The language provides the platform to bridge the differing justifications and create the empirical fact of human rights -- "Today, if the public discourse of peacetime global society can be said to have a common moral language, it is that of human rights" (1).
Thinking of human rights in terms of language also avoids the limitations of other conceptions. "The idea of a regime focuses attention on explicit rules and formal procedures for their application. To some extent these elements are present for human rights, but an exclusive focus on them would fail to embrace the ways in which human rights function as standards of aspiration— for example, as bases of political criticism, elements of a shared moral language, and ideals that guide efforts at political change by individuals and nongovernmental organizations" (43-44).
I wrote about this mostly because I thought it was really really cool. It also helps me think about rights differently, and raises a potentially obvious (but I think relevant?) question. I think, under Beitz's conception of human rights as an empirical fact of the world, they are essentially objects that we constructed to provide a common language of moral touchstones. If we created them, in theory, we could potentially dismantle them -- as norms make way for new norms. Language (even powerful, normative language) changes throughout history. Beitz himself acknowledges that the language and prevalence of human rights deteriorated during the Depression (16), supposedly when we had bigger (or smaller?) fish to fry. This is always my concern with empirical arguments -- just because the language of human rights is a fact now doesn't mean it will always be. But human rights feels (to me) like it carries a moral force separate from whatever we constructed in our shared history. Maybe I'm an intrinsic value person -- though I really think I'd rather be a practical, empirical person. And maybe this post will be irrelevant after we do Wednesday's reading. I'm really excited to see how Beitz develops this, because I might be on his team!
Hi Melissa,
ReplyDeleteGreat post! I'm so glad you brought up Beitz's point about the nature of creating a language of human rights that is both made up of “elements of a shared moral language” and constructed by (and, as you note, can potentially be dismantled by) people. Your post gets to the heart of the problem to which Beitz refers on page 21 when he notes that the drafters of the language of human rights and the General Assembly’s Third Committee were forced to “frame a public doctrine of [human rights] that was capable of endorsement from a variety of moral and cultural points of view but did not presuppose any more of a single, commonly accepted justifying theory than what could be extracted form and abstract appeal to the value of human dignity” (21). The drafters explicitly made this compromise in order to resist “import[ing] a parochial theological position” on other societies and cultures with different viewpoints.
This approach made me think of Rawls’s argument in Political Liberalism where he defends his two principles of justice against the diversity of opposing and irreconcilable viewpoints within the American populous whom he believes are all entitled to form their own conceptions of what is “good” in society. Rawls ultimately concludes that his two principles can be defended by an overlapping consensus of reasonable and comprehensive doctrines and that his principles are therefore justified.
However, in both cases, I worry, just as you do, that we have the power to destroy viewpoint-neutral, normative language and that this could eventually undermine the real justice claims people have as virtue of being people. (Unlike you, I really think I am an intrinsic value person.) Additionally, I also agree with you when you say, “human rights feels (to me) like it carries a moral force separate from whatever we constructed in our shared history.” Ultimately, I fell like all societies and cultures should be able to agree on a set of humanitarian needs and rights based solely on the fact that we are all people. To me, no reasonable theological position should be able to undermine the drafting of any human rights doctrines made in the name of asserting people’s virtues as people, and I do not understand why the “conception of human rights [has to be shaped] as a public doctrine open to a variety of justifications” (21). I agree that we need to read more and see how Beitz defends these claims.
Hi Melissa! Love your post! Beitz focuses on the language of human rights to capture its evolutionary nature, and more importantly, to further his argument of human rights as an emergent practice, which he acknowledges “less fully developed than in mature practices” (43). As you highlight, this evolving characteristic constructs human rights as “standards of aspiration” (43). It appears that Beitz considers human rights as an objective for the future and the evolving nature of language can capture its development and progress over time.
ReplyDeleteHowever, the changing nature of language brings up some concerns. I was particularly concerned with his emphasis on norms. I think that Beitz places too strong of faith that norms will point towards the right direction. Although the progressive nature of human rights intends to guides us towards down the right moral path, there is no guarantee that the future norms will be better than the present. Furthermore, this characterization of human rights as “standards of aspiration” deviates our attention from the present issues. While we generally learn from our mistakes in the past and intend to improve our actions in the future, there is no guarantee that we will fulfill these goals. Considering human rights as under this light takes away some sort of urgency to fix the matter now. This characterization sets forth the idea that as long as the intention is there to implement or improve human rights, the lack of fulfillment is acceptable because we are aspiring towards it.
I'm going to get on this train of discussing empirical claims vs. normative reasoning that has an evolutionary nature! This is awesome!
ReplyDeleteIn general, I'm not that scared about aspirational content within law, like the human rights doctrine or the American Constitution. I actually found solace in the fact that the "human rights doctrine is not static" (31). Beitz describes that "different rights are open to different strategies for implementation," and that some have "structural features of acceptable institutions" while others have "standards for policy and action that can be satisfied in many different types of institutions" (30). I would advocate for the latter, since it promotes some sort of end to which many different means can aspire. Through a standards-based approach of human rights, each domestic sphere can diaologically engage with its core commitments and better realize the prescription of what a human rights doctrine aims to aspire to in the future. I worry about time-rooted principles (Ah, Scalia!) and aspirational content seems to not "deviate our attention from present issues" (Tierra), but actually make us better envision a more just, human-rights- (not a real term) future. I realize that intention may present problematic justifications for processes which may not improve human rights, but I think a static conception may actually present more problems for our evolving human rights dogmas. If there are static, institutionally-structured conceptions of human rights, what happens to human rights law in cultures where these institutions look different, or what happens as our institutions themselves inevitably contort and erode?
I think this discussion get's at a point that has been raised in the last few readings. Most everyone can agree to the normative idea of human rights: human beings should have certain rights based simply on their existence as humans. The struggle seems to be why. Beitz uses a quote from the UNESCO Committee on the Theoretical Basis of Human Rights to highlight this point: “ we agree about the rights but on the condition that no one asks us why” (Beitz, 21). We have seen a number of arguments for and against the notion of human rights, and I agree with Melissa that thinking of human rights in Beitz’s terms is interesting and effective, but I am also beginning to wonder why we need to place so much focus on the why. With countless different cultures, nations, and ideals coming into play we may never be able to come to a universal agreement about why we believe in human rights. If we can all agree that they deserve to be respected, though, for whatever reason one brings to the table, isn’t that enough to try and hold each other accountable for protecting our agreed upon interests.
ReplyDeleteThis comment has been removed by the author.
ReplyDeleteHey everyone! I love this thread and I think our conversation is going the right way. I do have a couple places I want to push back -- the first is merely a clarification issue, and the second might be able to reconcile the intrinsic with the empirical.
ReplyDeleteTierra, I took issue with your discussion of Beitz on norms. You write that "Beitz places too strong of faith that norms will point towards the right direction," but I really don't think he's vulnerable to this objection, precisely because human rights "function as standards of aspiration" (43). What I'm about to say is actually implicit in parts of Melissa's original post: Beitz explicitly says that "the normative requirements of human rights [do not]...constitute a complete conception of justice (44). Instead, he claims that like many PUBLIC conceptions -- such as those regarding justice -- human rights can function as a "moral touchstone or a common reference point in deliberation about political action and social criticism" (44). Essentially this "shared moral language" enables us to talk TO instead of PAST each other in deliberations about justice. Bria's post also does a great job with this (her discussion of the General Assembly's Third Commission in particular). This is also the basic idea behind Beitz's discussion of preambles.
This brings me to my second point, which is directed at reconciling Melissa's empirical concern and Bria's conviction that intrinsic value is sufficient cause for human rights. It seems to me that the conflict is whether we can dismantle Beitz's claims about human rights if "moral language" and normative discourse substantively change, or whether human rights are more "timeless," which I think is implicit in Bria's intrinsic value bit. On Bria's view, we always ought to secure human rights, and on the empirical view (which I won't call Melissa's view because we're unclear) we only ought to secure human rights because we collectively believe we should. For the latter, I think this is an important quote: "Modern human rights cannot plausibly be regarded as seeking to articulate protections of timeless significance; it speaks to what might be described broadly as the conditions of modern life" (30-31).
In my view, our conception simply isn't likely to change all that much, so we probably won't have to reconcile the empirical with the intrinsic anytime soon. While this might seem like a silly claim given Beitz's account of human rights history (and our species' tendency to change our minds), I think it actually has some real weight, and seems analogous to Fukayama's "End of History" argument. While Marx would certainly disagree, Fukayama argues that we've reached the end of the road: liberal society and values are the culmination of our normative moral progress, and these values tend to be aligned with intrinsic value theories, at least in the way we conceive of them. What's key is that these liberal values are not going to significantly evolve in principle, and thus they won't come into conflict with intrinsic value perspectives
This comment has been removed by the author.
ReplyDeleteWow very interesting conversation! This discussion also reminds me a lot about Sen's discourse on what can be interpreted in historic and religious documents. As we discussed last time in class, many Eastern religions, interpreted in a certain light, can support particular democratic human rights. Similarly, Western rights developed through changes in religious interpretation. Is this talk about the changing nature of language similar to Sen's discussion? Do our rights change based on how we interpret language?
ReplyDelete