A State-Centric Approach to the Islamic State?

In A Fresh Start, Beitz is careful to construct a practical conception of human rights -- this means taking the "doctrine and practice of human rights as we find them in international political life as the source materials for constructing a conception of human rights" (102). This means that there are no fundamental rights which are independently discoverable, and that normative discourse/the current international rights order is how one must come to understand human rights. In some sense, this "constrains our conception of a human right from the start," but "a practical conception need not take the details of present practice as beyond criticism" (103, 105).

Yet some elements of Beitz's model go beyond "the details." For example, his model has three primary elements, and each must be secured if it is to hold: 

1) Human rights are designed to protect urgent individual interests against predictable dangers 

2) Human rights apply in the first instance to the political institutions of states, including their constitutions and laws -- while not all elements of international human rights doctrine must be codified, "governments have limited discretion to choose the means" by which they carry out human rights requirements.

3) Human rights are matters of international concern, so the international community may hold states accountable. Further, states and non-state agents have pro tanto reasons to A) assist states' in their capacities and B) protect human rights when the state isn't willing to do so.

This brings me to my primary concern with Beitz: as is implicit in my first paragraph, he's committed to recognizing the situation on the ground, and protecting urgent individual interests as they're constituted "in the modern world" (112). However in focusing on the role of states, Beitz's discussion of non-state actors suggests we are to rely on states "to regulate the behavior of non-state actors" (124). Yet what happens when there are failed states, or groups with incredible destructive capacities and no international accountability? Beitz admits that since human rights is an "emergent practice," episodic political efforts could become highly structured, and so we might need "a revision of the model" (124). It seems we've reached this point with the Islamic State, but how would Beitz argue we should move forward?

In answering this question, we're inevitably going to have to discuss "pro tanto" reasons for action. Pro tanto reasons "are genuine reasons for action, but they do not necessarily override competing reasons that may also be in play" (117). This means that action should be a measured, normative response to a human rights failure -- it "will not require action by outside agents" who are appropriately placed to act (117). Some cases will have "very strong pro tanto reasons" pushing the international community to act, but even these special cases aren't binding -- urgency to act is scalar, not binary (110). However, are we convinced that certain situations should not REQUIRE action from well-placed international actors? I certainly think we have a responsibility to combat ISIS and other abhorrent cases of genocide, but is Beitz okay to leave this up to normative judgement?