In proposing a two-level model of human rights, Charles Beitz
describes human rights as the protection of vulnerable “urgent individual
interests” from “standard threats” (110). I am interested in discussing the
urgent interest aspect. He considers urgent interests, for instance, as
standard protection from the state’s arbitrary use of power and assurance of
personal security, liberty, and nutrition. Beitz carefully distinguishes an
urgent interest from a universal one by defining establishing the qualification
for an urgent interest as one that “would be reasonable to regard its
satisfaction as important within some range of normal lives but we need not
believe that all persons value the interest or care about its satisfaction in
their own cases” (110). Receiving a certain level of education, for example under this definition,
may not be important to everyone, but is considered as significant enough to
fulfill and therefore, should receive protection.
While I
enjoy how Beitz anticipates the question of how we should weigh the variety of
urgent interests by defining urgency as a "scalar, not a binary,
property,” I found his answer to the existence of a threshold to determine the
qualifications of urgent interest as unsettling. Beitz argues that the
consideration of urgent interest depends on the situation and mainly relies on
normative judgment. He then sets limits on his model by mentioning that, “A model
can draw attention to the relevant considerations but it cannot settle the
judgments” (110). Considering this aspect, I am interested how this concept of
urgent interest deals with relative position. The concept of dignity that
Beitz mentions earlier in the reading directly corresponds with relative
position (67). To maintain dignity, Beitz highlights that a higher level of
material well-being may be necessary. Would the desire to uphold our dignity
serve as sufficient justification for an urgent interest? If so, it seems that
any want could be perceived as urgent as long as it fits under Beitz’s standard
of an urgent interest.
Hi Tierra!
ReplyDeleteAwesome blog post! It weaves in so many concepts that we have covered! I agree; it is interesting how Beitz discusses urgency as scalar and as dependent on normative judgment. Beitz further clarifies that this normative judgment would manifest as considering factors “such as the likelihood that the threat protected against will actually occur, the feasibility of implementing the protection in typical circumstances, and the likely cost of making the protection effective” (110). Thus, I think he is considering this normative judgment as more of the judgment of the effect of the urgent interest and the predictability of the occurrence. I think perhaps this has less to do with the justification for urgent interest, but rather how that urgent interest will affect us. This distinction does not completely soothe your worries, as perhaps that effect is dependent on our country and relative position. With these considerations in mind, I do think, though, that a higher level of material wellbeing (and I’m think significantly higher here) will probably not constitute as a sufficient justification for an urgent interest.
Hey Tierra!
ReplyDeleteGreat post! I also found Beitz's discussion of urgent interests to be intriguing. I think you and Ellen are right to point out Beitz's non-answer/deferment when it comes to the normative judgment on what constitutes a human right. Beitz's model appears as more of a framework than a theory, although he does a lot of heavy lifting while constructing it—for instance, as Ellen notes, specifying the factors that ought to comprise a valid normative judgment.
At the end of your post you dial in on Beitz's standards for determining the urgency of interests, a step I agree is critical seeing as urgent interests are those ultimately designated as human rights. His subsequent passage on standard threats, though, ought to offer you (some) solace. On page 111, Beitz states that the "human rights of international doctrine are not, for the most part, best understood as unrestricted or blanket protections of urgent interests.” This section is an extension of what Ellen previously mentioned regarding the "likelihood that the threat protected against will actually occur" and he additionally notes that, “most human rights are at least implicitly and often explicitly limited in the range and type of threats against which they require institutions to offer protection” (110). Questions regarding relative position and social inclusion/dignity are especially tricky for the reason you mention—where do we draw the line between wants and needs (presumably urgent) when we sometimes need wants for social opportunity? Do they become needs, then? And what of the discrepancy in urgency between my need for a cell phone in our country and someone else's need for basic clothing in their country?